

CHINA AND TAIWAN – THE AMERICAN DEBATE

MICHAEL PILLSBURY

Michael Pillsbury assesses threat perceptions in the Taiwan Strait, arguing that should tensions reach breaking point, the US and China could well find themselves on a collision course. This is a timely debate that explores China's national interest in the wider context of Pacific regional security.

A bilateral policy of US engagement with China is, in essence, a policy aimed at binding China into the norms and structures of the current international order. Trends favour this policy, but there lies a clear potential for the breakdown in the relationship, and hence a serious threat of conflict, perhaps even a war, between the US as the dominant power and China as its rising challenger, according to a warning in this journal in 2006.¹ We can gain insight into the challenges faced by the Obama administration as it develops policy toward China by examining the policy debate underway among former US officials about China's future course. To my knowledge, the views in these US debates have not been drawn together in one place. I do not attempt to explain the origins of these policy differences, or why some former officials are more pessimistic than others. Retired Admiral Eric McVadon, former defence attaché in Beijing, has testified that how one characterises China's military and security influence is often a function of one's leaning, either toward 'China bashing' or 'panda hugging'.² Optimism and pessimism seem to be evenly balanced. Admiral McVadon himself has testified about his hope for joint long-term naval cooperation between Beijing and Washington. Other influential voices are not so hopeful.

The fundamental issue in the debate for both Chinese and Americans remains the question of Taiwan, especially arms sales and military support for Taiwan.

This issue is in the background today as Taiwan pursues cross-strait detente, but the Obama administration has already stated that it remains possible that a breakdown in cross-strait negotiations could see tensions re-emerging. Cautious optimism seems realistic about both the future security situation for Taiwan and the future of US military relations with China. It is important to be clear about the downside risks, however, and the prospects for a new Cold War with China. How the Taiwan issue is managed by Beijing, Taipei and Washington will determine the future of US-China relations. Preceding the May 2008 Taiwan Presidential elections, the increased rhetoric from China regarding its concerns about potential moves toward Taiwan independence appeared to signal a greater willingness by Beijing to use force. Although the rhetoric from China decreased after the election of Ma Ying-jeou, there have been no signs that China's military dispositions have changed significantly. This continuing threat provides the backdrop to the controversies to be surveyed.

Debates about US Policy: Optimistic and Pessimistic Factors

The Obama administration has begun to make clear its views about Taiwan security issues. The American Institute in Taiwan's Chairman, Raymond Burghardt, described US policy recently in a meeting with the press.³ Burghardt said the US was 'truly enthusiastic' about the detente, but that the level of cross-

strait engagement should be decided by Taiwan and China alone. 'There is not a view in Washington that there is some kind of red line in terms of cross-strait engagement. There is not a concern that moving beyond economic issues into the political and military realm is threatening to us,' Burghardt told the press. 'We are comfortable with what's happening and where it seems to be going.' Importantly, he also cautioned that tensions could re-emerge if the negotiations break down. How to handle the Taiwan issue is a vital part of the policy debate among former US officials.

The Factors for Pessimism

Before turning to the causes for optimism, several pessimistic factors should be examined that former US officials have recently emphasised. They are: the prospects for miscalculation by China with regard to the use of force due to nationalism; the declining balance of power in the Taiwan Strait; the desirability of a hedging strategy; whether US pre-emptive strikes on China should be part of Taiwan's defence; and in the broadest sense whether China is gaining new feasible options to use force against Taiwan if the current negotiations fail. Optimistic factors include the reasons Beijing may be deterred from use of force; generational changes in Taiwan, increasing trade; investment and contacts between Taipei and Beijing; and Beijing's rather narrow focus on Taiwan independence as the main threat.

Chinese Nationalism and Potential Miscalculations in the Use of Force

How rational would the People's Republic of China's (PRC) leadership be if cross-strait talks break down? Could Chinese nationalism lead to miscalculation if the current negotiations break down? Optimists and pessimists may be found on both sides of these questions.

There are many studies by former US officials suggesting that nationalism may make China prone to miscalculation about the use of force, or prefer to use military surprise and shock as part of diplomacy. Miscalculation could easily arise out of tensions and ambiguity over Taiwan. Indeed, China has for years warned about somewhat vague 'red lines'. The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned it would use force have evolved over time in response to Taiwan's declarations of political status, changes in People's Liberation Army (PLA) capabilities, and Beijing's view of Taiwan's relations with other countries. These circumstances, or red lines, have included:

- Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence
- Internal unrest in Taiwan
- Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-strait dialogue on unification
- Foreign intervention in Taiwan's internal affairs.

Somewhat vaguely, Article 8 of the March 2005 'Anti-Secession Law' states that Beijing will resort to 'non-peaceful means' if 'secessionist forces ... cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China'; if 'major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession' occur; or if 'possibilities for peaceful reunification' are exhausted. The ambiguity of these red lines appears deliberate, allowing Beijing the flexibility to determine the nature, timing, and form of its response. Added to this ambiguity are political factors internal to the regime that could affect Beijing's decision calculus.

The extensive research on China's approach to using force needs to be taken into account. Susan Shirk suggests 'the real danger' lies not in China's

astonishing growth but in the 'deep insecurity of its leaders.'⁴ She warns that 'we face the very real possibility of unavoidable conflict with rising China.' Shirk argues that because of China's political fragility and secretiveness, doubts remain about whether its leaders will be able to keep a steady hand on the tiller. She concludes: '[p]reventing a war with a rising China is one of the most difficult foreign-policy challenges our country faces.' Chinese nationalism can be dangerous.⁵

During the 1999 summer seaside session of the leadership, Shirk states that the party leaders had strong sentiments in favour of 'some dramatic mili-

How the Taiwan issue is managed by Beijing, Taipei and Washington will determine the future of US-China relations

tary gesture' against Taiwan, to show that China would not be pushed around. China's president 'managed to postpone any use of force against Taiwan' by appeasing the military with budget increases. She describes the negative image the US and China have of each other and she warns that the way America approaches China's rise can either reinforce its responsible personality or 'inflammate its emotional one'.

Richard Bush argues that 'centralization can foster misperceptions about an adversary's intentions, as can political orthodoxy that excludes certain lines of analysis. Both are at work in how Beijing's leaders view Taiwan'.⁶

In *Beyond Tiananmen*, President Clinton's National Security Council (NSC) adviser for China, Robert Suettinger, makes a telling judgment about how the new Chinese leadership would cope in a future crisis by asking whether the decision-making system which is 'opaque, non-communicative, distrustful, rigidly bureaucratic, inclined to deliver what they think the leaders want to hear, and strategically dogmatic, yet susceptible to

political manipulation for personal gain – will be up to the task of giving good advice'.⁷

Thomas Christensen argues the Chinese have 'on several occasions ... used force to affect and shape long-term political and security trends in the region and at home, not to resolve security problems permanently'. Christensen's book *Useful Adversaries* concludes that Beijing could promote aggression or be capable of rash action.⁸

John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai argue that the Chinese military has well studied 'lessons': Beijing has enshrined and encoded the historical experience from the Korean War 1950-53, the first and second Quemoy crises, the Sino-Indian border conflict (1962), the Sino-Soviet border battles (1969) and the Sino-Vietnamese border (1979). This inventory up is used to make each succeeding crisis or actual military action fit for purpose; and also updates previous standardised war summaries or 'models'. So long as the future appears to fit the pattern, Chinese responses will have a certain order and predictability. Lewis calls the leadership in 1969 'paranoid', asserting that Machiavellian methods and personalistic politics remain firmly in place.⁹

Beijing's Increasingly Feasible Military Options

The US Defense Department has spelled out its concerns about what could happen if tensions re-emerge. DoD is worried that the PLA is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, China could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-held islands such as the Pratas, Penghu Islands or Itu Aba. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability and political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while showing some measure of restraint. However, this kind of operation includes significant, if not prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanise the Taiwan populace and generate international opposition.¹⁰

Four other possibilities that DoD has described are worth keeping in mind as feasible options for Beijing if the current talks break down:

Maritime Quarantine or Blockade: Although a traditional maritime quarantine or blockade would have greater impact on Taiwan, it would also tax PLA Navy capabilities. PLA doctrinal writings describe potential lower-cost solutions – air blockades, missile attacks, and mining – to obstruct harbours and approaches. Beijing could declare that ships en route to Taiwan must stop in mainland ports for inspections prior to transiting to Taiwan ports. China could also attempt the equivalent of a blockade by declaring exercise or missile closure areas in approaches to ports, in effect closing port access and diverting merchant traffic. China used this method during the 1995–96 missile firings and live-fire exercises.

Limited Force or ‘No War’ Options: China might use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, likely in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the populace’s confidence in the Taiwan leadership. Similarly, PLA special operations forces infiltrated into Taiwan could conduct economic, political, or military sabotage and attacks against leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign: Limited short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) attacks and precision strikes against air defence systems, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities could support a campaign to degrade Taiwan’s defences, neutralise Taiwan’s military and political leadership, and possibly break the Taiwan people’s will to fight.

Amphibious Invasion: Publicly available Chinese documents describe

different operational concepts for amphibious invasion. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air and naval support, and electronic warfare. The objective would be to break through or circumvent shore defences, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites in the north or south of Taiwan’s western coastline, and launch attacks to split, seize, and occupy key targets and/or the entire island.¹¹

Should the US Maintain the Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait?

Former US officials Richard Bush and Allan Romberg have disputed the proposals of former CIA analyst Robert Sutter for a major US-Taiwan policy review that would survey the merits of ending US support for the cross-strait military balance.¹² Sutter believes that consultations among policy experts in and out of US government and recent developments suggest that the longstanding notion of US-supported balance in the Taiwan Strait is no longer viable in the face of ever-increasing Chinese influence over Taiwan. Sutter states that the US needs to put aside the abiding US emphasis on sustaining a balance of influence in the Taiwan area favourable to and heavily influenced by the United States. He questions whether China’s growing influence in the Taiwan area makes it unwise to work with Asia-Pacific allies, notably Japan, and other regional partners in constructing contingency plans to hedge against the possibility that rising China may become aggressive or disrupt the regional order.

Questioning the Hedge Strategy

Robert Sutter raises doubts about the need for constructing contingency plans to hedge against the possibility that a rising China may become aggressive. The ‘hedge strategy’ is reportedly based in part on enhancing US forces on Guam.¹³

Pacific forces Commander Admiral Timothy Keating told the press recently

that the United States is building up forces on Guam with an eye towards a future conflict with China. Keating told a group of defence reporters on 28 January 2009 that the issue of the strategic build-up on Guam, which has been underway for the past three years, was not raised by Chinese military officials during his recent visit to China. Asked if the Chinese are monitoring the build-up, Keating said:

I kind of hope they do. We’ve got a number of B-2s in Guam now. I’m hoping they notice. We’re doing our best to make sure they do. We want them to understand that we’re going to continue to course around the Pacific in ways apparent and maybe not quite so apparent, but we’re going to utilize all the arrows in our quiver, if you will, and B-2s in Guam, continuous bomber presence writ larger in Guam and elsewhere. We’ve been told to do it by Defense Policy Guidance, and we’re most assuredly doing it.

Guam is being upgraded by the Pentagon as a central strategic operating base in the Pacific and would be used in case of a future conflict with China over Taiwan or other issues, or as a base for operations for a war in Korea. Additionally, Guam is being beefed up to better project power to the strategic oil-producing region of the Middle East. Enhancements have included hardened storage facilities for B-2 bombers, additional attack submarines and better communications and infrastructure.

The Finlandisation of Taiwan?

Two former Bush administration officials have published pessimistic warnings about Taiwan’s future.¹⁴ Dan Blumenthal

The real danger lies in the deep insecurity of China’s leaders

and Aaron Friedberg argue that Taiwan has not done nearly enough to improve its defences. Nor has America done all it could to improve Taiwan’s self defence and deter Chinese temptations toward aggression. They warn that Taipei may

become nervous and increasingly desperate because Taiwan is more isolated today, and more threatened, than it was eight years ago. Beijing's relentless pressure on the military front; its unceasing efforts to isolate Taiwan from the international community; and the perception, mistaken or otherwise, of waning American support could combine to produce very dangerous consequences.

Blumenthal and Friedberg also warn that a deepening sense of isolation and hopelessness could at some point cause the Taiwanese people and their government to simply give up, accepting whatever terms they could get from a triumphant mainland. The 'Finlandisation' of Taiwan by the current Chinese regime would run directly counter to America's long-range aim of helping to build an Asia that is free and at peace.

Cross-Strait Balance: Does the Air and Naval Balance Now Favour China?

One school of thought is that China is deterred from the use of force against Taiwan due to a favourable military balance of power.¹⁵ Two retired naval officers present the opposing view that the balance has turned against Taiwan. For example, regarding the naval balance, Bernard Cole concludes that the PLA Navy would be effective against Taiwan's forces, even if the United States were to intervene. He writes that the maritime balance of power in the Taiwan Strait 'rests with the PRC'.¹⁶

In terms of air power, Cole's analysis indicates that the PLA Air Force has made steady improvement over the past decade and, probably, has eroded Taiwan's air advantage. As is the case with naval forces, he concludes that '[g]eography, force modernization, and force size favor mainland airpower'. Cole believes 'China's ground forces face a significant problem when arriving on the battlefield against Taiwan's Army'. Ground combat against Taiwan would require a major amphibious invasion supported by special operation and airborne forces. Cole reports 'low morale throughout Taiwan's military' and a significant reluctance to support military spending. He concludes his assessment with the warning that Taiwan's military

capability is declining and there is not much popular will for a stronger deterrent force.

Can Taiwan's Vulnerable Navy and Air Force Be Protected? The Porcupine Concept

William Murray concludes that Taiwan needs a porcupine or army-based defence because China either already has or shortly will have the ability to ground or destroy Taiwan's air force and eliminate the navy. This prospect fundamentally alters Taiwan's defence needs and makes the intended acquisition from the United States of diesel submarines, P-3 aircraft, and PAC-3 interceptors ill-advised.

Murray argues that Taiwan would be far better served by hardening, and building redundancy into, its civil and military infrastructure and systems. In that way the island could reasonably hope to survive an initial precision bombardment; deny the PRC the uncontested use of the air; repel an invasion; and defy the effects of a blockade for an extended period. Many of these actions, in fact, would be consistent with recent efforts by Taiwan to improve its defences.

Murray points out that Taiwan's navy could probably fight the PLA Navy effectively.¹⁷ It possesses highly advanced equipment, including four *Kidd*-class destroyers and Harpoon anti-ship and SM-2 anti-air missiles; and its officers and men have a reputation for competence. In consequence, Murray reasons, China can be expected to look for a way to defeat this force decisively without a campaign of symmetrical, force-on-force attrition. He believes that a surprise, long-range precision bombardment on Taipei's navy while it is in port seems a clear choice. Beijing would need sufficient weapon accuracy, availability, and reliability, as well as targeting information, but all of these are now within the PRC's technical ability. Accurate weaponry is useless without knowledge of the precise location of targets, but targeting Taiwan's surface combatants in port is increasingly easy. In the age of Google Earth, Murray writes, the latitude and longitude of naval piers at Taiwan's naval bases are easy to determine exactly, and these piers are finite in number. Moreover, many of Taiwan's naval bases are

also commercial ports, suggesting that direct observation of surface ships within them would be a simple matter.

US and Japanese F-22s to Prevent Launch of Chinese Missiles and Fighters

In contrast to the porcupine concept, two former US Pentagon officials have recommended pre-emptive preparations to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. The key measure is for the US to make the Lockheed F-22 available to Japan. This would not only confer high status to America's Japanese allies, as Tokyo would be the first foreign military recipient, but also significantly impact the cross-strait military balance. Mark Stokes and Randall Schriver argue that the F-22, in both US and Japanese hands, could target Chinese air defences, critical nodes within the PLA's theatre command system that control offensive air and missile operations, airbases, staging areas, and logistics centres. F-22s are fighter aircraft that provide stealth, speed, agility, and the fusion of sensors. They state that the F-22's avionics are optimal to counter PLA air defences and conduct the range of interdiction missions to force a cessation of hostilities on terms favourable to the United States, its allies, and ad hoc coalition partners. They argue that this capability is a 'critical enabler' for air superiority in the Taiwan Strait. The F-22 Raptor, fielded in sufficient numbers and in the inventory of the air forces of forward-based allies, could dissuade a PRC coercive campaign. In the event of an actual conflict, rapid and stealthy penetration, along with air-to-ground munitions capable of destroying air defence systems, may allow the F-22 to disrupt or destroy an enemy air defence network in support of follow-on friendly forces entering enemy airspace on strike missions.¹⁸

Optimistic Factors: Is Beijing Deterred from Military Action?

In the author's view, so long as Taiwan's deterrence is also strengthened there are eight factors that may deter China from taking military action against Taiwan and provide President Ma the opportunity to pursue his effort.¹⁹ These military factors are complemented by other trends, but

optimism about these should not induce complacency in the perception of the threat. The eight factors are as follows:

1. China does not yet possess the military capability to accomplish with confidence its political objectives on the island, particularly when confronted with the prospect of US intervention. Moreover, an insurgency directed against the PRC presence could tie up PLA forces for years.
2. A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would also affect the interests of Japan and other nations in the region that advocate a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait dispute, and would likely result in a fundamental re-ordering of the East Asian security architecture.
3. A war could severely retard Chinese economic development. Taiwan is China's single largest source of foreign direct investment.
4. International sanctions could further damage Beijing's economic development.
5. China's leaders recognise that a conflict over Taiwan involving the United States would lead to a long-term hostile relationship between the two nations – a result that would not be in China's interests.
6. Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military manoeuvres.
7. An invasion of Taiwan would strain China's untested armed forces and almost certainly invite international intervention.
8. Taiwan's investments to harden infrastructure and strengthen defensive capabilities could also decrease Beijing's ability to achieve its objectives.

Optimism about Taiwan's Younger Generation

Interestingly, one optimistic study shows that Taiwan's younger generation differs from its elders in having more confi-

dence in dealing with the PRC. This study argues that Taiwanese public opinion is increasingly favourable to peaceful relations in the Taiwan Strait. Using generational analysis, it shows that younger Taiwanese tend to be pragmatic, moderate, and open-minded about China. For those born after 1950, loving Taiwan does not mean hating China. If the PRC refrains from acting in ways that provoke negative reactions from young Taiwanese, current trends suggest that Taiwan's public will demand better relations between the two sides in the future.²⁰

Optimism about Trends in Cross-Strait Engagement

Those who are optimistic about building trust with China could also point to Chinese positive assessments that pre-date the Ma Ying-jeou administration and therefore bode well for the reconciliation process. For example, the 28 May 2008 meeting between the Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao and the Nationalist Party Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung was covered in *Banyuetan*.²¹ Interestingly, the background notes in the article revealed the sharp increases in cross-strait exchanges over the past three years, especially during the last years of Chen Shuibian's administration:

- As of the end of 2007, there had been a cumulative total of 1.63 million mainland resident visits to Taiwan and 47 million Taiwan visits to mainland China.
- During 2005–07, the total of visits from Taiwan residents to the mainland was 14 million; this is equivalent to a third of the total number of visitors in the previous seventeen years.
- As of the end of 2007, the PRC had approved 75,000 investments by Taiwan residents in the mainland, and Taiwan businesspeople had actually invested a total of over US\$ 45 billion in China.
- In 2006, cross-strait trade exceeded US\$ 100 billion for the first time, reaching US\$107.84 billion.
- As of February 2007, PRC institutions of higher education

had cumulatively enrolled over 20,000 students from Taiwan.

Optimism about Beijing Reducing the Military Threat to Taiwan

An optimistic recommendation regarding Taiwan's security was put forward in a report sponsored by the Center for a New American Security, a think tank that Pentagon policy chief Michèle Flournoy led before joining the Obama administration.²² The report notes the most delicate issue likely to arise in the foreseeable future regarding US arms sales to Taiwan is the island's pending request for F-16C/D aircraft. 'The wisdom of such a sale is hotly debated both in Taiwan and in the United States,' the report states.

The action that could defuse the issue would be meaningful steps by Beijing to reduce the military threat facing Taiwan, thus alleviating some of the pressure on Taipei to proceed with such a purchase. The problem of the aging Taiwan air force will still need to be addressed, but a reduction in the direct military confrontation could make other options appear more feasible.

Optimism about Opposing Taiwan's Independence

Optimists could also point to Chinese military studies that articulate the sole threat focus as Taiwan's independence, which President Ma Ying-jeou has explicitly ruled out. The US has also repeatedly sought to reassure China that it does not support independence. China claims its military build-up is aimed solely at checking independence forces, not Taiwan's prosperity or other aspirations. No less a PLA figure than Lieutenant General Zhao Keshi, Commander of the Nanjing Military Region, wrote in 2008:²³

Faced with the complicated and stern situation over the Taiwan Strait, our armed forces have continued to take the military struggle preparations against 'Taiwan independence' as the most important, most practical, and more pressing strategic task. Centering around the strategic objective of 'opposing and checking Taiwan independence by military means,' we have made systematic planning and scientific organization,

explicitly determined targets, tasks, and time nodes, continued to improve the action plans, greatly enhanced the building of combat forces, and stepped up preparations in all aspects by doing down-to-earth work. In the 30 years of reform and opening up, our armed forces ... effectively deterred the 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces by organizing major war readiness actions and military exercises.

Similarly, Beijing fears that Taiwan will be 'alienated' by enemy forces. This too has been the subject of reassurances by both Taiwan and the US. The US does not seek military bases on the island in order to incorporate Taiwan as part of its defence system. Some PLA analysts have explored the geopolitical value of Taiwan in extending China's maritime 'defensive' perimeter and improving its ability to influence regional sea lines of communication. For example, Generals Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi in the PLA Academy of Military Science text *Science of Military Strategy* state:²⁴

If Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland, not only [would] our natural maritime defense system lose its depth,

opening a sea gateway to outside forces, but also a large area of water territory and rich resources of ocean resources would fall into the hands of others.... [O]ur line of foreign trade and transportation which is vital to China's opening up and economic development will be exposed to the surveillance and threats of separatists and enemy forces, and China will forever be locked to the west of the first chain of islands in the West Pacific.

Confusion about China's Strategic Intent

The optimists and pessimists will not likely resolve their debates. Rather, China's long-term intentions may even become the subject of confusion. Recently, US Navy Admiral Timothy Keating told the Senate Armed Services Committee, '[t]he *Impeccable* incident is certainly a troubling indicator that China, particularly in the South China Sea, is behaving in an aggressive, troublesome manner, and they're not willing to abide by acceptable standards of behaviour or rules of the road.' At the same time, Keating noted that China is co-operating with the international naval task force led by the United States to fight piracy in the Gulf

of Aden, off the east coast of Africa. The admiral said the two types of Chinese behaviour are confusing: '[i]t's conflicting to us and it's confusing. And this goes to the root issue of what are, really, their intentions. What is their strategic intent? Where does China expect to be 10, 20, 50 years from now?'²⁵

What seems to be clear is that the long-term shape of the Chinese–American strategic relationship will depend decisively on managing the Taiwan issue successfully. Both sides agree on this. Now the ball is in Beijing's court, and the optimists in the Washington policy debate will be the winners if – and only if – China makes sufficient concessions to Taiwan to reciprocate President Ma's gestures in his first year in office, ensuring there will be no breakdown of the talks and no re-emergence of the threats about which the pessimists have been so worried. A necessary concession from Beijing will have to be military confidence-building measures that reduce the immediate Chinese military threat. ■

Dr Michael Pillsbury is a Pentagon consultant and the former Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning

NOTES

- Justin Hempsom-Jones and Alexander Neill, 'Managing a Rising Power: Strains in US China Policy', *RUSI Journal* (Vol. 151, No. 3, June 2006); see also June Teufel Dreyer, 'Understanding the Status Quo: Perception and Reality on China-Taiwan Relations', *RUSI Journal* (Vol. 152, No. 1, February 2007).
- Rear Admiral Eric A McVadon, US Navy (Retired), Testimony before the US-China Economic & Security Review Commission, Washington DC, 4 March 2009.
- Jenny W Hsu, 'U.S. Comfortable With Détente', *Taipei Times*, 19 March 2009.
- Susan Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 139.
- A growing list of articles and books on nationalism include Peter Hayes Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); James Townsend, 'Chinese Nationalism', *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* (January 1992); Edward Friedman, 'Chinese Nationalism: Challenge to US Interests', in Stephen J Flanagan and Michael E Marti (eds), *The People's Liberation Army and China in Transition* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2003); Suisheng Zhao, 'Chinese Nationalism and its International Orientations', *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 2000); Geremie R Barmé, 'To Screw Foreigners is Patriotic: China's Avant-garde Nationalists', *China Journal* (July 1995); Howard W French, 'China's Textbooks Twist and Omit History', *The New York Times*, 6 December 2004, p. A-10; Yongnian Zheng, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); and Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949–1958* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).
- Richard C Bush, *Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005).
- Robert Suettinger, *Beyond Tiananmen* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001). See also Chen Youwei, 'China's Foreign Policymaking As Seen Through Tiananmen', *Journal of Contemporary China* (November 2003), pp. 715–722. A PRC Foreign Ministry defector, Chen Youwei, identifies similar pathologies in Beijing's decision-making, reading the worst intentions

- into an adversary's actions, ideological ossification, divorce from reality, faulty intelligence and what he calls the 'celestial mentality' that assumes an air of self-importance.
- 8 Thomas Christensen, *Useful Adversaries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 254.
 - 9 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2006).
 - 10 'Military Power of the People's Republic of China', Annual Report to Congress, US Department of Defense, released 25 March 2009.
 - 11 Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S Chase, Derek Eaton and Kevin L Pollpeter, *Entering The Dragon's Lair: Chinese Anti-Access Strategies And Their Implications For The United States* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007); Chung Chien, 'High Tech War Preparation of the PLA: Taking Taiwan Without Bloodshed', *Taiwan Defense Affairs* (Vol. 1, October 2000), pp. 141–162.
 - 12 Richard Bush and Alan D Romberg, 'Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States – A Response to Robert Sutter', Pacific Forum CSIS, Number 17A, 12 March 2009. Bush and Romberg wrote: 'There is in Sutter's analysis a lurking fear that the mainland's power will lead to PRC intimidation and Taiwan submission. We cannot rule out that the people of Taiwan will someday decide that unification on terms dictated by Beijing is an acceptable outcome. But the odds of that are not high because Taiwan has resources that will encourage PRC restraint. It remains an open question whether Beijing will be willing to make the sort of concessions that prove Ma's case with respect to dignity and security.... What is not open to question is that Taiwan voters have the clear option of punishing Ma and the KMT'.
 - 13 'U.S. Making No Secret of Its Strategic Buildup On Guam', 6 March 2008, available at <www.East-Asia-Intel.com> or at <http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2008/ea_china_03_06.asp>, accessed 3 April 2009.
 - 14 Dan Blumenthal and Aaron Friedberg, *An American Strategy For Asia: A Report Of The Asia Strategy Working Group* (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, January 2009), <http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.29144/pub_detail.asp>, accessed 3 April 2009.
 - 15 See, for example, Michael O'Hanlon, 'Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan', *International Security* (Vol. 25, No. 2, Fall 2000), pp. 51–86; Michael A Glosny, 'Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan', *International Security* (Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2000), pp. 125–160; Robert S Ross, 'Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations', *International Security* (Vol. 27, No. 2, Fall 2002), pp. 48–85; and David A Shlapak, David T Orletsky and Barry A Wilson, *Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2000).
 - 16 Bernard D Cole, *Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects* (New York: Routledge, 2006).
 - 17 William S Murray, 'Revisiting Taiwan's Defense Strategy', *Naval War College Review* (Summer 2008).
 - 18 Mark Stokes and Randall Schriver, *Evolving Capabilities of the People's Liberation Army: Consequences Of Coercive Aerospace Power For United States Conventional Deterrence*, Project 2049 Institute Report (August 2008). See <<http://www.project2049.net/documents/080905CHINADETERRENCEPAPER.pdf>>.
 - 19 Michael O'Hanlon, 'Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan', *International Security* (Vol. 25, No. 2, Fall 2000), pp. 51–86; Michael A Glosny, 'Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan', *International Security* (Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2000), pp. 125–160; Robert S Ross, 'Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations', *International Security* (Vol. 27, No. 2, Fall 2002), pp. 48–85; David A Shlapak, David T Orletsky and Barry A Wilson, *op. cit.*; Thomas J Christensen, 'Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy', *International Security* (Vol. 25, No. 4, Spring 2001), pp. 5–40; Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, 'Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force', *International Security* (Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2004), pp. 161–196; Bernard D Cole, *Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects* (London: Routledge, 2006); Shirley Kan, 'Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales since 1990', CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: CRS, 5 July 2005), pp. 17–22; Denny Roy, 'Taiwan Perilously Ponders Its Strategic Missile Force', Jamestown Foundation China Brief 6, No. 20.
 - 20 Shelley Rigger, *Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and 'Taiwanese Nationalism'* (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2006).
 - 21 *Banyuetan*, November 2008. *Banyuetan* is the official journal of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Propaganda Department and the Xinhua News Agency.
 - 22 Ralph A Cossa, Brad Glosserman, Michael A McDevitt, Nirav Patel, James Przystup and Brad Roberts, *The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration*, 2009, p. 49. Available at <www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CossaPatel_US_Asia-Pacific_February2009.pdf>, accessed 3 April 2009. The Center for a New American Security crafted the report with the Center for Naval Analyses, the Institute for Defense Analyses, the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies and the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Pacific Forum.
 - 23 Lieutenant General Zhao Keshi, Commander of the Nanjing Military Region, 'Theoretical Innovations and Scientific Practice in Improving the Armed Forces' Combat Capabilities by the Communist Party of China Leadership Since Reform and Opening Up', *China Military Science* (May 2008), pp. 47–56.
 - 24 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, *Science of Military Strategy*, (PLA Academy of Military Science Press, 2000).
 - 25 Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 11 March 2009, <<http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/speeches.shtml>>.